Introduction
One of the key challenges for economic policy in Germany since the 1980s has been to try to reduce the gap relative to the US with regard to the development of high technology industry ("high tech") . 1 In the debate on the causes of this perceived backwardness, differences between the financial systems of the two countries have received special attention. In particular, the shortage of equity capital available for high risk, but potentially high return investments in startup companies (i.e. "risk capital") has been identified as a serious barrier to the development of high-tech in Germany (Albach 1983; Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld, and Lerner 1997) . Although Germany has a well-developed banking system, bank lending is inappropriate for financing high tech startups due to the high risk of failure and the lack of fixed assets that could serve as security for the loans.
In addressing this issue over the past decade, the policymaking community has been strongly influenced by the law and economics approach to agency theory (Hart 1995; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Posner 1973) . In contrast with earlier work in financial economics, which focused on the cost of capital, the law and economics perspective emphasizes problems in the governance and monitoring of companies by shareholders, as well as conflicts of interest between large and small shareholders. According to this perspective, key regulatory problems in Germany have been the lack of transparency in company reporting and the weakness of shareholder rights (Hopt 1995; Hopt, Rudolph, and Baum 1997) . As a result, potential investors have been discouraged from providing risk capital to high-tech startups.
Based in part on the agency perspective, a major institutional innovation was introduced in Germany in 1997: the creation of a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange called the "Neuer Markt" (Beike, Köttner, and Schlütz 2000; Knips 2000) . In contrast with the main stock exchange, the listing rules of the Neuer Markt required more detailed and frequent reporting by companies, and also provided for stronger protection of small shareholders. Initially the Neuer Markt appeared to be a great success. The number of new companies raising capital through listing on the stock market and offering shares to the investing public (in financial jargon an "initial public offering", or IPO) increased from an average of roughly 20 per year in the first half of the 1990s to about 130 in both 1999 and 2000. Much of this activity was in "new economy" companies. The Neuer Markt became the clear leader of the set of stock markets or market segments created for small high-tech companies in Europe in the late 1990s.
However, following a sharp decline in stock prices after March 2000 (the socalled "bursting of the stock market bubble"), the level of IPO activity declined rapidly. Due in part to a total standstill in IPOs activity, the Neuer Markt was declared a failure by its owners and closed in 2003. Proponents of the agency approach argue that a number of scandals and cases of conflicts of interest show that regulation in fact was not strong enough to satisfy the concerns of small investors. According to this view, the policy solution to this problem is to increase the degree of regulation even further. This paper offers an alternative point of view based on the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach developed by Peter Hall, David Soskice, and a number of other scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001) . According to this view, the main cause of failure of the Neuer Markt was not the weakness of the financial regulatory system, but rather the difficulty of transplanting individual institutional features of liberal market economies (LMEs, or countries characterized by the dominance of markets as coordinating mechanisms) such as the US to coordinated market economies (CMEs, or countries in which non-market mechanisms play a much greater role in economic coordination) such as Germany. Specifically, the broader financial system and labor markets in Germany represent a hostile environment into which it is very difficult to successfully import institutions that work well in places like Silicon Valley. On the capital market side, Germany lacks a significant capitalized pension system (the main source of equity capital in LME countries like the US) and the household sector has invested for the most part in less risky types of assets. Household investment in Neuer Markt companies in the late 1990s represented a "brief summer" of flirtation with equity culture influenced by the world wide internet euphoria. On the labor market side, the lack of an open market for mid-career scientists and entrepreneurs makes it very difficult to attract the type of labor needed to create successful high-growth entrepreneurial companies, i.e. the Microsofts and Intels of the future. As a result, no companies based on the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial model of organization have developed successful "blockbuster" products needed to achieve a high level of sales. A critical mass of such companies, it is argued here, would have been needed to sustain the Neuer Markt in the long run.
The second section of the paper reviews the debate on the "high tech problem" in Germany and the focus on financial factors as the key bottleneck here in light of agency theory. The third section describes the rise and fall of the Neuer Markt and policy prescriptions offered by the agency perspective. The fourth section offers an alternative explanation for the failure of the Neuer Markt in terms of the VOC framework. The fifth section summarizes and concludes by discussing policy alternatives for Germany in view of this analysis.
The Debate on the Weakness of High Tech in Germany
In the 1980s a sustained debate started in Germany on the causes of a perceived backwardness in the development of newer, high-tech (i.e. research and development intensive) industries (Albach 1983; Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld, and Lerner 1997) . Although Germany was a clear world leader in so-called mediumtech industries, such as motor vehicles, machinery, and chemicals, it was less successful in the development of newer industries, such as semiconductors, computer hardware, software, and biotechnology. Indicators of backwardness here included the level of start-up activity (i.e. foundation of new firms in these sectors), world market share of high tech products, and number of high tech firms offering "blockbuster" products (i.e. research-intensive mass standardized goods, such as microprocessors or operating system software).
One possible explanation for this weakness in high tech is offered by the new institutional economics (NIE). This approach analyzes microeconomic behavior in terms of the economics of information and contracting (the "principal-agent" approach) (Berglöf 1991; Williamson 1985; Williamson 1988) . Information is assumed to be both imperfect and costly. Furthermore, relationships between parties are subject to "moral hazard"; that is, agents will engage in self-interested opportunistic behavior in the absence of monitoring mechanisms and incentives to behave in the contracting principal's interests. Cross-national differences in financial contracting can in part be explained by the varying levels of success different legal and regulatory regimes have in increasing transparency and controlling opportunistic behavior (Berglöf 1991; La Porta et al. 1997) .
A leading example of this type of analysis is provided by the influential article "Legal Determinants of External Finance" (La Porta et al. 1997) . In this article La Porta et al. examine the relationship between types of legal regimes and financial regulations on the one hand and a number of indicators of national financial development on the other hand. Regression analysis of these variables for 49 countries explains about half of the cross-national variation in IPO activity (the rate of IPOs per million population) in 1995-96. This analysis, it is argued, shows that the nature of the legal system is the most significant determinant of the IPO rate. Common law systems predominant in English-origin countries are particularly supportive of IPOs. Specific financial regulations also have a significant positive impact, including the "one share-one vote" principle and rights enabling shareholders to overcome management opposition. The GDP growth rate variable was also significant, but the size of the coefficient was small; the absolute level of GDP was not a significant variable. The implications of this analysis is that countries can improve their level of financial development, including the rate of IPO activity, by adopting elements of the common law system and/or financial regulations strengthening shareholder rights.
Policy analyses based on this approach have put major emphasis on the need for strict regulation to promote the supply of "risk capital" to finance the growth of the firm. High tech firms generally loose substantial amounts of money in the first years after foundation. In the earliest stage of growth (start-up phase), the firm incurs costs for research and development (R&D) for new products, but generally earns little or no income (see Table 1 ). In the expansion stage the firm's revenue increases with growing sales of new products. However, the firm frequently is not yet profitable due to the costs of expanding production facilities and/or sales and marketing operations. Only in the later stages of development will the firm have a stable profits base due to an established market and economies of scale. In this context, the institutional structure of the German financial system has been criticized for not satisfying the needs of startup firms and risk-friendly investors (Beike, Köttner, and Schlütz 2000; Knips 2000) . Until the mid 1990s a key feature of the German financial system was that the universal banks controlling the Frankfurt stock exchange only allowed IPOs of companies with a solid history of profitability. Loss-making high tech companies in the early stages of development were therefore excluded from the market.
A second problem was lack of transparency, which made it difficult for investors to judge the risks involved in investing in high tech companies. Whereas the practice for companies listed in the US is to report their financial status on a quarterly basis (i.e. every three months), German listed companies for the most part would report on an annual basis, or only provide limited quarterly information. Furthermore, German companies used German HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch, i.e. Commercial Code) accounting standards, which were considered to give companies too much leeway in deciding how to report their financial situation and hide income. Furthermore, companies were not required to provide a cash-flow statement to supplement the balance sheet and income statements.
Finally, minority shareholder protection was considered inadequate. Insider investors (e.g. founders and family) and large institutional investors typically have greater influence and better access to information than small shareholders. This advantageous position can be used to make money by purchasing shares before positive information becomes public (or losses avoided by selling before negative information becomes public.
These weaknesses were held to prevent or to discourage not only potential investors in the IPOs of growing high-tech companies, but also to stunt investment in much younger companies many years away from an IPO. The early-stage portion of the venture capital market is dependent upon an active stock market, since venture capitalists typically would not invest in early-stage companies without the possibility of exiting their investments a few years later through an IPO. In the first half of the 1990s there was much less German venture capital activity than in the US, and this activity was concentrated much more in later stage companies than was the case in the US (Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld, and Lerner 1997) .
The Rise and Fall of the Neuer Markt
The agency perspective had a great influence on the institutional design of the Neuer Markt, which was founded in March 1997, as well as on other growth markets in Europe founded around the same time (Garz, Gilles, and Volk 1999; Posner 2000a; Posner 2000b ). In the 1970s and early 1980s, financial economics literature stressed the cost of capital and the hierarchy of finance (i.e. differential preferences for different types of financing). In 1987 a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange (the "geregelter Markt") was created under the influence of the "cost of capital" approach. This approach emphasized the higher cost of capital for smaller firms, due in part to the high fixed costs involved in an IPO. Less strict regulation for smaller firms was recommended to compensate for these higher costs. However, the "geregelter Markt" failed to significantly increase the number of IPOs in Germany.
The Neuer Markt was designed to address a number of deficiencies in the main stock market in Frankfurt vis-à-vis smaller growth companies (Vitols 2001) . Specific features of the Neuer Markt included:
• Greater transparency for investors, particularly for smaller "outsider" investors who did not have intimate access to company management.
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Companies listing on the Neuer Markt were required to report on a quarterly basis (i.e. more frequently than companies on the main market). Furthermore, international accounting standards (US-GAAP or IAS), which were considered more reliable than the German HGB standards, were to be used;
• Liberal listing requirements, which allowed relatively new companies as well as loss-making companies to get a listing;
• Increased protection for small shareholders, for example in defining a minimum period of time after the IPO during which inside investors could not sell their shares ("lock-up period").
• Greater liquidity, that is, the ability to buy or sell shares near the current market price, provided though a system of designated sponsors obligated to provide bid-ask market quotes (prices at which the designated sponsor would buy or sell shares).
Thus the Neuer Markt was designed to mimic a number of aspects of the US NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers electronic exchange), home of high-tech successes such as Microsoft, Intel, Cisco Systems, JDS Uniphase, Dell Computer, Biogen and Amgen.
Initially the Neuer Markt got off to a slow start, with only twelve IPOs in 1997 (see Chart 1). In addition, a number of companies transferred from other segments of the Frankfurt stock exchange. Nevertheless, some of these turned out to be rapid successes, such as the new mobile phone company Mobilcom, one of the main winners in the newly deregulated telecommunications market. Word of these successes spread, and the developing mythology of the "new economy" attracted many first-time investors to the stock market. In 1998, despite the serious (but temporary) stock market decline caused by the Asian crisis, the number of IPOs climbed to 41. During the peak of the bubble in 1999 and 2000 there were more than 130 IPOs annually. At the same time, the number of IPOs on the main market increased only slightly. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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The success of the Neuer Markt was based in part on widespread media coverage, which reached people previously not invested in the stock market. For example, the business television station "ntv" reported every half hour from the floor of the Frankfurt stock exchange. Popular publications including not only staid weeklies such as Spiegel but also television guides and fashion magazines expanded their coverage to include recommendations for purchasing stocks from the Neuer Markt.
By 2000 the Neuer Markt had become by far the most significant growth stock market in Europe, accounting for over 50% of market capitalization, and overtaking markets in countries with more developed equity markets, such as the UK's AIM and France's Nouveau Marché (WestLB/Panmure Research 2000) . Significantly, the Neuer Markt also had become a platform for IPOs for companies from other countries, including the US. The composition of the Neuer Markt appeared to be solidly high-tech, with 22 percent of the listed companies classified as Internet companies, 19 percent as technology companies, and 17 percent as software companies. As time went on, an increasing proportion of these companies were venture-capital backed, as a parallel rapid expansion was also taking place in the venture capital industry in Germany. In 2000, the German Venture Capital Association reported that half of all Neuer Markt IPOs had some form of venture capital participation. In a relatively short period of time, it therefore appeared as if Germany had successfully reformed its financial system so it was capable of supporting both "old" and "new" economy companies. However, this hubris rapidly turned out to be short lived.
At the end of March 2000, after reaching an all-time high of over 9000, the Nemax all-shares index (composite index for companies on the the Neuer Markt) began a rapid descent that would bring it down to 300 by 2002. Perhaps even more devastating for the reputation of the Neuer Markt than this decline of over 96% in stock market value, however, was the growing number of scandals that were emerging. Most of these involved managerial misrepresentation of the financial situation of the company. The most audacious of these was at Comroad, an internet company, where an investigative journalist found that 98 % of the sales for the first half of 1999 were accounted for by one contract with a nonexistent Hong Kong firm.
However, the scandals uncovered spread beyond company managers, including price manipulation by the investment manager of one of the major funds specializing in small firm investment (Kurt Ochner, known at the time as "Mr. Neuer Markt"). Conflicts of interest were also uncovered for stock analysts and for the issuing departments of investment banks. 
The Failure of the Neuer Markt: A Varieties of Capitalism Approach
The conventional wisdom for the failure of the Neuer Markt in Germany focuses on the inability of regulators to adequately control "moral hazard" on the part of company managers and finance professionals vis-a-vis the investing public. In part influenced by this view, the government has responded by trying to tighten up company and securities law and by beefing up the enforcement capacities of the financial services regulator, BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-aufsicht). In March 2003 the federal finance ministry announced a 10 Point Plan defining a roadmap for passing legislation designed to improve transparency, to create new mechanisms for minority shareholder complaints, and to increase penalties for violators of securities law.
Although the agency approach offers a simple, attractive explanation for the failure of the Neuer Markt which appears to have been accepted by policymakers, a number of facts cast doubt on the plausibility of this approach. One concern is that IPO activity stopped not only on the Neuer Markt, but also on the main Frankfurt market. Despite the increase in the level of the regulation overall, there were no IPOs on the main market at all in 2003, and only five in 2004. In other words, the decrease in activity below levels typical of the early 1990s would seem to indicate some type of shock to the investment community and financial system that spread beyond the Neuer Markt, i.e. of deeper problems within Germany.
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A second, related concern is that IPO activity since the bursting of the bubble has recovered significantly in many other countries. A third concern is that, although scandals admittedly occurred on the Neuer Markt, in fact the extent of "moral hazard" activity arguably was much less in Germany than in the US, the "model" for tight securities regulation. For example, the percentage of IPOs accounted for by loss-making companies during the peak of the bubble was much lower in Germany than in the US. Furthermore, the finance scandals in Germany clearly paled in significance in comparison with the Enron scandal in the US. These facts cast doubt on the efficacy of the principalagent approach in explaining the failure of the Neuer Markt.
An alternative explanation is provided by the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). In a nutshell, this approach makes a number of strong claims about the way advanced industrial economies function. The first claim is that the national institutional framework is a key determinant of how firms operating within this framework are organized and behave. The second claim is that economies can be analytically broken down into a number of discrete subsystems, such as financial systems, training and education systems, industrial relations systems, and R&D/technology transfer systems. The third claim is that there are strong complementarities between these subsystems. Economies with well-matched institutional subsystems will enjoy comparative advantages, whereas an institutional mismatch can adversely affect the operation of the economy. Finally, from a VOC perspective, advanced capitalist economies fall into two broad groups: liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the U.S.A. and the U.K., in which markets play a dominant role in economic governance; and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, Japan, and Austria, in which non-market mechanisms play a particularly strong role in economic governance. LMEs are considered to offer a particularly supportive institutional environment for radical product and process innovation, e.g. in the high-tech industry, whereas CMEs are better at incremental innovation in medium-tech industries such as automobiles or machine building. Source: Own compilation.
Of particular interest for a VOC approach to high tech IPOs are the complementarities between financial systems and labor markets and the resulting implications for stock markets. A key distinction to be made here is between entrepreneurial and conventional firms (Engelhardt 2004; Engelhardt 2005 ) (see Table 2 ):
• Entrepreneurial firms attempt to develop radically new, standardized products, the production of which can be multiplied at decreasing costs (economies of scale). Companies attempt to rapidly achieve a dominant position in the new market. Potential rewards are very high, particularly if a mass market develops for the product ("blockbuster"); economies of scale mean that profits increase more rapidly than the increase in production. Investors may therefore reap very high rewards as the value of the firm grows, and employees may also benefit financially, particularly if they are granted stock options in the company. However, the entrepreneurial company also involves high risks for both investors and employees.
Companies developing radically new products have a high risk of failure, thus employees may loose their jobs and investors may loose the initial capital they invested in the company.
• Conventional firms in contrast concentrate on competing in established markets through offering products with incremental improvements. The potential growth rate in sales and products is thus limited. The risks of job loss and capital loss are lower for employees and investors, but potential rewards are also lower.
The successful high tech firms listed on US Nasdaq correspond to the entrepreneurial type of firm. Firms such as Microsoft (operating systems software), Intel (microchips), and Cisco Systems (network hardware) all started out by offering a standardized, but radically new type of product that enjoyed economies of scale and created a new market. Although conventional high-tech firms do exist, they tend to focus on providing customized software for one or a limited number of customers, or IT services.
An important empirical regularity in financial economics is the positive relationship between the return and risk of different asset classes (Bernstein 2001; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 2002) . Return is the increase in the value of the initial investment in the asset. Risk is the variance in the returns of an asset class. Concretely, although expected returns may be positive, the investor faces the risk that annual returns for a number of years after the investment is made may be negative. The intuition behind this relationship is that investors will demand a risk premium (i.e. higher expected returns) for riskier assets (i.e. those with more volatile returns). This general relationship is summarized in Figure 1 , which shows the positive relationship between return and risk (defined as the variance of returns).
FIGURE 1: RISK-RETURN RELATIONSHIP IN INVESTMENTS
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The concept of investors with different preferences for reward and risk is well known from financial economics (see section 4.1 below), but can also be applied to human capital. Due to the greater probability of bankruptcy, entrepreneurial firms involve higher risks for employees than conventional firms. Employees will thus demand strong financial incentives from the company in the form of stock options or incentive pay, so that they will enjoy high financial rewards in case the company is successful. Risk-averse managers, however, will be reluctant to work for a startup company, even if the expected returns may be high.
The primary thesis presented here is that successful entrepreneurial firms require an adequate supply of both risk-tolerant capital and experienced, risk-tolerant entrepreneurial managers and scientists. This situation can be displayed graphically (see Figure 2) . The vertical dimension represents the risk-reward profile of investors; investors at the bottom will be willing to invest in low risk, low reward products, whereas investors at the top will be willing to incur higher risks in the expectation of higher rewards. A parallel can be made for labor markets, displayed on the horizontal axis. Risk-averse managers and scientists will be willing to take jobs in which the potential financial rewards may not be large, but the risk of job loss is low (left side of Figure 2 ). Conversely, risk-loving managers Low High
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and scientists will be willing to accept a high risk of job loss if potential rewards are quite high (right side of Figure 2 ).
The lower left hand quadrant of Figure 2 can thus be understood as an equilibrium for conventional firms, in which both the financing and labor available seek low risk, low reward possibilities. The upper right quadrant, in contrast, represents an equilibrium for entrepreneurial firms, in which both investors, managers and scientists are willing to incur higher risks in search of higher rewards. The upper left hand and lower right hand quadrants, on the other hand, represent disequilibria, in which the risk profiles of investors and employees do not match.
FIGURE 2: RISK-RETURN EXPECTATIONS AND EQUILLIBRIA FOR ENTREPRENURIAL AND CONVENTIONAL COMPANIES
The following sections detail shifts in the financial market and labor market position of Germany within the context of a discussion of the Varieties of Capitalism approach. It will be argued that Germany experienced a temporary shift from the low to high financial market risk-return expectations in the late (Bernstein 2001; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 2002) . The intuition behind this relations is that investors will demand a risk premium (i.e. higher expected returns) for riskier assets (i.e. those with more volatile returns). Table 3 displays the risks rewards typically associated with three different types of financial assets: bank loans/bonds, stock in large, established ("blue chip") companies, and stock in young companies. • Short-term debt issued by the US government (1 month US treasury bills)
DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES
• Medium-term US government debt is also considered quite safe in terms s onth o is considered the safest investment by financial investors. The risk that the US government will default on its debt is seen to be virtually zero. In no single year in the period 1926-98 did investors in this asset experience a loss.
3 However, this asset class also had the lowest returns (3.77 % on an annualized basis); of default risk. However, the value of this debt fluctuates with medium-run inflation expectations. A purchaser of a 5 year Treasury note, for example, is exposed to the risk that expectations of inflation may increase after the purchase, leading to a decrease in medium-term interest rates and thus a decrease in the nominal value of the securities. The volatility of returns between 1926-98 has thus been about 75 percent higher for 5 year note than for 1 month bills, with the worst annual return amounting to 2.65 percent. Investors have thus demanded a risk premium relative to 1 m bills of about 2.5 percentage points (5.31 percent versus 3.77 percent) on an annualized basis;
• The return on the stocks of large companies is substantially higher than ). r • Small company stock offers the highest return of all asset classes shown practice most investors are not be prepared to invest in all types of assets.
rn.
ince different types of assets have varying risk-reward profiles, heterogeneity in s, such as r ns MEs and CMEs differ substantially in their ability to provide risk capital to stock s the return on US government debt (11.22 percent on an annualized basis However, the volatility of returns is almost four times higher than that for 5 year notes and more than six times higher than that for 1 month bills (standard deviation of about 20 %). The maximum loss in a single yea came to 43 percent during 1926-98; and (12. 18 percent annualized return), but also involve by far the highest risk, with almost twice the volatility of large company stocks and a maximum annual loss of 58 percent.
In Instead, investors are distinguished by different risk-reward preferences. Riskaverse investors will prefer assets with a low expected return and low variability of returns ("low risk"). Risk-loving investors, on the other hand, are willing to accept a higher level of risk in order to achieve a higher expected level of retu S risk preferences among investors lead to different levels of demand for different kinds of financial assets. Risk-averse investors will find loans or company bonds most attractive, since these assets offer a low return (generally a fixed interest rate) but also lower risk. In the event of company bankruptcy, loan or bondholders are repaid before holders of other types of financial claim shareholders. Investors with moderate levels of risk aversion, on the other hand, will be attracted to stocks in established companies; historically, stocks have offered a significantly higher return than bonds, but also carry somewhat highe risk, since shareholders are the last claimants in case of company bankruptcy (Siegel 1994) . Finally, risk-loving investors will be attracted to investments in venture capital or in the stock of growing high-tech companies, since they are willing to accept a high risk of non-repayment in return for the exceptional retur that may be realized from investments in rapidly-growing companies. L markets. Table 5 details the rate of IPO activity in different countries. LMEs have a significantly higher rate of IPOs over the past decade and a half, at between roughly 40 to 60 IPOs per million residents. The most important CMEs, Japan and Germany, have a fraction of the IPO activity experienced by LMEs over thi period. O is the distribution of retirement income provision between the "three pillars" of household savings at pension funds, i.e. state pensions, occupational/company pensions and private retirement savings. Pension funds have become the most important investor in the stock market in countries like the US and UK. Countries in which the large bulk of retirement savings are provided by state "pay as you go" pension systems by definition will have less capacity to provide a pool of ris capital coming from pension funds or private pension savings. Table 6 ). In the late 1990s, an estimated 82 percent of total income of retirees was accounted for by the state pension system. Furthermore, company pensions in Germany are for the most part funded o book reserves set aside within the company's balance sheet, rather than out of capitalized pension funds (Jackson and Vitols 2001) .
State Pensions, late 1990s
A financial risk preferences of the household sector. German households have a particularly high aversion to risk in financial investment in comparative perspective. One indicator for this is the low percentage of households or indirect (i.e. through equity mutual fund) share ownership (see Table 7 ). There was no significant change in retirement policy in Germany in the second the t in half of the 1990s which would have yielded a significant growth in pension funds investing in the stock market. However, there was a major increase in the amount of funds the household sector invested in the stock market through vehicle of equity funds. Detailed figures available for US and Germany show tha the rate of investment in equity funds in Germany in the first half of the 1990s was about one tenth the level in the US (Table 8 ). The rate of investment increased in both countries in the late 1990s, but much more dramatically percentage terms in Germany than in the US (ca. 1000 percent versus ca. 50 percent). In the period 2001-2003 household investment in equity funds in both countries has returned to historical norms. 
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A startups is influenced by the characteristics of both labor markets and financial markets. In particular, CMEs have considerably less open labor markets for mid career scientists, engineers and managers. In systems where employees are oriented towards long-term careers with the same company, and in which train and socialization takes place after entry into this company, it is difficult to get a job at another company in mid-career. This therefore creates a "vicious circle" situation, where it is not easy to recruit experienced engineers and managers fo risky start-ups, since many are not willing to take the risk of not being able to reenter the labor market at an established firm after the failure of a startup.
T career histories of founders of successful US entrepreneurial software companies (see Table 9 ). These companies have achieved annual sale least $ 200 million in 2003 and fulfill the definition of "entrepreneurial" outlined above. It is striking that, although the mythology of the "whiz kid" entrepreneur i widely accepted, only Bill Gates fits the profile of a very young person with no extensive work experience. In fact the typical entrepreneur is in his mid-30s to mid-40s and has significant experience with a high technology company. s . HRST include scientists, engineers, and R&D-re managers. This survey confirms the picture of broad differences between LMEs and CMEs and of particularly low mobility in Germany (Stimpson 2000) . The mobility statistic reported in Table 10 represents the percentage of personnel   20 have started a new job in the past year. The two LMEs in the study (Ireland and the UK) are among the top three countries in terms of the mobility of HRST personnel in high tech industry. The only exception to the rank ordering is Sp (a CME), which has the highest rate of mobility in high tech industry. ain ermany, on the other hand, is second to last in mobility in high tech among the 1999: 20) ." L towards somewhat higher mobility rates across countries, but no radical ch in the degree of mobility or in the rank ordering of countries (Stimpson 2000) . The German labor market for mid-career managers and scientists does not appear to have become significantly more open over the past half a decade.
T 1997, Germany was located in a conventional company equilibrium in which both investors and employees had a low risk-reward profile. In the late 1990s there was a significant increase in the amount of risk capital. The surge in high tech IPOs on the Neuer Markt was attributable to this brief surge in the availability o 22 risk capital. Since 2001, however, the supply of risk capital has reverted to levels corresponding more to the norms of the 1980s and first part of the 1990s.
erman labor markets, however, never fundamentally changed, and a large
FIGURE 3: RISK-RETURN EXPECTATIONS IN GERMAN LABOR
G supply of experienced managers and scientists willing to join startup companies never developed. Although startup companies on the entrepreneurial model were able to attract risk capital, they never had enough experienced managers and scientists needed to succeed. Thus in the late 1990s Germany briefly shifted up to the upper left hand quadrant (a situation of disequilibrium). Since then it has shifted back to the conventional company equilibrium in the lower left hand quadrant.
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Low High
Financial Market
High Low Early Late 1990s Evidence supporting this view can be gather th arguably the premiere industry for entrepreneurial companies, since the costs of increasing production are negligible (i.e. the cost of a CD for duplicating softw code) (Engelhardt 2004) . A successful standardized product can sell millions of copies, reaping millions or even billions of dollars in profits. The most prominent example of an entrepreneurial company in software is Microsoft, which has long been the largest company in the US in terms of stock market capitalization (i.e. the financial value of the shares of a company). However, the costs of developing a new software application can be quite high, and startup companies can spend millions of dollars without a guarantee of ever making a cent in sales. Software startup companies are therefore seen as a risky, but potentially quite rewarding investment. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In practice it rical base appears that two kinds of software and IT services companies ctually came to the market in Germany in the 1997-2001 period. On the one ntrepreneurial (mainly companies trying to develop standardized software in al, e are) fit ience at at pport of the Varieties of apitalism-based "temporary disequilibrium" argument. One is that the proportion as t e a hand, companies that can be classified as "conventional" (mainly IT services companies as well as software companies in mature sectors) arguably did not need risk capital for their moderate growth strategies. These companies took advantage of the financial euphoria and raised capital on the Neuer Markt.
2001-now
Entrepreneurial Company Equillibrium
Risk-Return Expectations Labor Market Risk-Return Expectations
On the other hand, a number of companies that could be classified as e newer areas such as internet and security applications) also had IPOs (Engelhardt 2004) . Although these entrepreneurial companies raised risk capit the characteristics of their founders were quite different than those of th founders of successful entrepreneurial software companies in the US displayed in Table 9 above. The founders of only one of the companies (IXOS Softw the profile of the successful entrepreneurial US software company of mid-career employees with substantial experience with at least one other high tech company. Most founders in Germany were in their 20s or early 30s, and their work experience was typically independent consulting experience, exper a traditional company (machine building or financial services), or research jobs a university or research institute (see Table 11 ).
Two further pieces of evidence can be taken in su C of companies that could be classified as "entrepreneurial" as opposed to "conventional" was rather low in Germany in comparison with the UK. Only 27 percent of the German software companies were clearly entrepreneurial, opposed to 44 percent in the UK. Secondly, German entrepreneurial software companies failed to achieve major market share in new industries. The larges software company in terms of sales in Table 11 above was about € 100 million in 2002 (Engelhardt 2005) . The sales of leading internet software companies in th US, in contrast, reached $ 1 billion or even more in 2002, such as Verisign ($ 1.2 billion) and BEA Systems ($ 1 billion).
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